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COMMENT
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURTS EXPANSIVE
APPROACH TO THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: A
LOOK AT THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
SECTION 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act ["FAA"] was enacted in 1925 to
ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements
in contracts involving maritime transactions or interstate com-
merce.' Intending the Act to be a simple method by which an
opportunity would be given to enforce written arbitration agree-
ments,2 Congress enacted what has become a confusing and
controversial statute.3 Because of the absence of an in-depth
discussion regarding the scope and applicability of the Act,4
Congress placed unintended burdens upon the courts to deci-
pher congressional intent. Of particular concern to the courts
was the authority by which Congress enacted the FAA.
Section 2 of the FAA establishes that certain agreements to
arbitrate contract disputes shall be "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equi-
1. Arbitration Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§
1-208 (1988)) [hereinafter the Act or the FAA].
2. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924); 65 CONG. REC. 1931
(1924).
3. Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Re-
quirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 386
(1992-93).
4. Id.; see also Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).
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ty for the revocation of any contract."5 Congress' intent in
drafting section 2 of the FAA was to create legislation that
would "place ... [arbitration agreements] upon the same foot-
ing as other contracts, where [they] belong."6 However, many
questions regarding section 2 were not addressed by Congress.
For example, Congress did not specifically state under which
constitutional provision the FAA was enacted. Congress also
failed to provide a standard by which to determine whether a
contract "evidences a transaction involving commerce."7 These
questions have been addressed by the lower courts and, to some
extent, the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court began analyzing section 2 of the FAA
thirty years after it was enacted! Over the next forty years,
the Court greatly expanded the application of the FAA to con-
tracts containing arbitration agreements.9 The Supreme Court
expanded the FAA to apply in state courts in 1983 when it held
that section 2 of the FAA preempts state laws that hold arbi-
tration agreements unenforceable." Despite the expansive view
taken by the Supreme Court in addressing the scope of section
2 of the FAA, it was silent on issues relevant to interpreting
the Act. The Court had never expressly established a standard
by which to interpret the "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce" language of section 2 of the FAA." In 1995, the
Court was given the opportunity to do so in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Co. v. Dobson." It not only decided which standard
to apply, but it also addressed the authority upon which the
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a con-
tract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
6. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
7. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
8. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1955).
9. See infra part III.A-E.
10. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
12. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
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FAA was enacted and the Act's preemptive powers." But was
the Court correct in its decision? How was it received by Con-
gress, legal commentators, and the lower courts? And what
would be the impact of Allied-Bruce Terminix on arbitration
and arbitration law across the country?
This comment answers such questions by discussing the path
of prior holdings the Court travelled to reach its decision, and
evaluating the validity of the Allied-Bruce Terminix holding.
Part II gives the background and history of arbitration and the
FAA. It also outlines the critical issues raised by the language
of section 2 of the FAA. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's
analysis of these critical issues through the enactment of the
FAA to the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision. Part III also shows
how the United States Supreme Court has expanded the reach
of the FAA through its decisions but has left its opinions about
other issues ambiguous. Part IV discusses the Allied-Bruce
Terminix decision as it addressed these issues. Part V analyzes
the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision. This comment then reviews
the reaction to the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision by Congress,
the lower courts, and the legal commentators. The comment
ends with a discussion of the possible effects the Allied-Bruce
Terminix decision will have on arbitration and arbitration law
across the country.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AND THE FAA
Arbitration is defined as "a process of dispute resolution in
which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after
a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be
heard." 4 These decisions are usually binding upon the parties
as per their written agreement. Within the past few years,
parties have dramatically increased their use of arbitration to
resolve a variety of disputes. 5 This increase in arbitration has
13. See infra part IV.
14. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990). "
15. The number of security cases that have been submitted to arbitration has
increased 250% since the stock market crash in 1987. G. Richard Shell, Arbitration
and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 521 (1989). The number of labor
cases submitted to arbitration has increased by 70% since 1972. Linda Hirshman, The
Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
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been attributed to "[t]he high cost, delays, and uncertainties of
litigation.""6
The benefits of referring a dispute to arbitration rather than
litigation are numerous. Arbitration's informal process relative
to litigation makes it cost efficient. The informal nature of the
process "enhances the behavior of courtroom participants...
[and] diminishes the adversarial nature of dispute resolution by
encouraging arbitrating parties to work closely together in an
effort to seek common solutions." 7 Arbitration procedures also
offer confidentiality, whereas a public trial will ultimately dis-
close the identities of the parties and the details of the dis-
pute.1
8
Arbitration is not a new alternative to litigation. In fact, it
has been used to solve disputes since the days of ancient
Greece, when "traveling wise men, for a fee, would act as ad
hoc arbitrators." 9 In medieval times, it was widely, if not ex-
clusively, used for resolving business disputes. ° However, arbi-
tration lost favor with the English courts and was met with
judicial hostility.2' This judicial hostility has been linked to
the fact that English judges were paid fees based upon the
amount of cases they decided. 2 The judges found that arbitra-
tion infringed upon their livelihood. Common law hostility to-
wards arbitration was adopted by the American courts.' The
courts were slow to change, but growing industrialization in-
creased the frequency of business disputes and lessened the
hostility towards arbitration.'
1305, n.7 (1985).
16. Hirshman, supra note 15, at 1305, n.7.
17. David P. Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of its
Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623, 625 (1992).
18. Id.
19. John C. Norling, The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's Preemption Power:
An Examination of the Import of Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 7 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 139 (1991).
20. Cohen, supra note 4, at 266.
21. See Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).
22. Pierce, supra note 17, at 6251.
23. H.R. REP No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924).
24. Norling, supra note 19, at 139.
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A. History of the FAA
To codify this changed view of arbitration, Congress began
drafting the United States Arbitration Act to ensure that arbi-
tration agreements in contracts would be protected and enforced
as valid contract provisions. An important marker in the pro-
mulgation of the FAA was the 1924 United States Supreme
Court decision, Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,25 which
upheld New York's recently passed arbitration law. By validat-
ing a law compelling arbitration, the Court opened the door for
Congress to pass similar legislation. Congress followed the
Court just a year later when, on February 12, 1925, President
Coolidge signed the United States Arbitration Law.
B. Scope of the FAA
Section 2 is the substantive provision of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.28 It makes "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" writ-
ten provisions calling for arbitration in any "maritime transac-
tion or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,"
except where there are "such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."" "Commerce" is de-
fined generally as it is in the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution." When the transaction or contract does
not fall within this definition, or that of "maritime transac-
tions,"29 the Act will not apply."0 Although it is suggested
25. 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
26. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1982).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
28. The FAA defines "commerce" as:
... [clommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in
any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or
between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory
and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and
any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). The Commerce Clause reads: "To regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes ..
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. The FAA defines "maritime transactions" as "charter parties, bills of lading of
1995] 1503
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that most contracts will be covered by the Act,3 in practice,
the broadness of the Act depends upon the scope given to it by
the courts.32
Section 2 was drafted to make "valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable" arbitration agreements in contracts involving com-
merce.33 Legislative intent was to enact a statute making "val-
id and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in
contracts involving interstate commerce.... The remedy is
founded also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce
and over admiralty. The control over interstate commerce reach-
es not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but
also contracts relating to interstate commerce."34 Clearly, Con-
gress had the authority to regulate and control interstate com-
merce.35 However, Congress also noted that "[w]hether an
agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question
of procedure ... and not one of substantive law."36 Congress
was equally capable of "prescrib[ing] the jurisdiction and duties
of the Federal courts"37 under its Article III power to control
federal court jurisdiction."5 The distinction would not be rele-
vant but for Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,39 in which the
Court held that:
water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs
to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if
the subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction .. " 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
30. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1955).
31. Jon R. Schumacher, The Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act: Implications on
State Procedural Law, 70 N.D. L. REV. 459, 461 (1994).
32. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 841-43 (1995).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
34. H.R. REP No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981).
36. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
37. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 405-06 n.13 (1966) (citing
Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees
on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1924).
38. Article III of the United State Constitution states in part that "[the judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferi-
or Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
39. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the State .... There is no federal general com-
mon law. Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State ... and no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such power
upon the federal courts.'
After Erie, when a conflict arose in a diversity case between
state and federal law, and that conflict would "significantly
affect the result of a litigation," the court had to apply state
law.4' Therefore, if the FAA was considered a rule of proce-
dure or a "substantive rule of common law"42 applicable to fed-
eral courts under Congress' Article III powers, it would not
apply to state courts. If, however, it was enacted to address
"malters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress,"' as was the case with interstate commerce and the
Commerce Clause, then the FAA would apply to state courts
and federal courts equally. At the time the FAA was passed,
Congress did not foresee the Erie decision and therefore did not
specify which path it took in drafting the FAA. Through the
years after Erie, the United States Supreme Court developed an
interpretation of congressional intent." In Southland Corp. v.
Keating, the Court held that the FAA was enacted under
Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce as provided
in the Commerce Clause." This interpretation was reaffirmed
in Allied-Bruce Terminix but was questioned by the dissent.'
C. "Evidencing a Transaction Involving Commerce"
While Congress' conflicting statements caused confusion and
disagreement regarding the scope of the FAA, congressional
silence caused problems in determining when contracts
40. Id. at 78.
41. Id. at 80.
42. Id. at 77.
43. Id. at 78.
44. See infra part 1II.B-G.
45. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983); see supra note 10 and accom-
panying text.
46. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995); see infra part IV.
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evidenced a transaction involving commerce. As stated above,
congressional intent was to create a statute that made "valid
and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in con-
tracts involving interstate commerce."47 Section 2 of the FAA
specified that these contracts were to "evidenc[e] a transaction
involving commerce."4" However, Congress did not directly
address the means by which courts could decide that contracts
evidenced this transaction involving commerce. Without clear
congressional direction, the courts were forced to develop and
interpret a standard themselves. The unintended result of
Congress' silence was a varied judicial interpretation of the
Act's "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" require-
ment.
Before Allied-Bruce Terminix, the United States Supreme
Court had never directly stated what standard it would apply
to the issue.49 Legal commentators were equally silent on the
issue, often addressing preemption and applicability without
mentioning the standard by which to determine whether a
contract "evidences a transaction involving commerce."" How-
ever, lower federal courts and state courts did articulate stan-
dards for determining whether these transactions involved com-
merce for purposes of the FAA. These cases indicate two dis-
tinct tests created by the courts: the "contemplation of the par-
ties" test and the "commerce-in-fact" test.
1. The "Contemplation of the Parties" Test
Some courts concluded that Congress did not intend for the
FAA to extend to all transactions that Congress could constitu-
tionally regulate. These courts generally followed the concurring
opinion of Judge Lumbard in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Construction Co.5
47. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
48. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
49. See infra part III.A-B (discussing Bernhardt and Prima Paint).
50. See, e.g., Schumacher, supra note 31, at 463 ("the United States Supreme
Court noted that the 'commerce' requirement is not difficult to fulfill.")
51. 287 F.2d 382 (1961).
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[T]he legislative history of the Arbitration Act of 1925 re-
veals little awareness on the part of Congress that state
law might be affected .... Congress was not seeking to reg-
ulate and control activity affecting commerce, but was pro-
viding for those engaged in interstate transactions an expe-
ditious extra-judicial process for settling disputes. The Arbi-
tration Act may be avoided entirely by those engaged in
interstate traffic if they merely refrain from including any
arbitration provisions in their contracts .... The significant
question, therefore, is not whether, in carrying out the
terms of the contract, the parties did cross state lines, but
whether, at the time they entered into it and accepted the
arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate
activity. ... [E]vidence as to how the parties expected the
contract to be performed and how it was performed is rele-
vant to whether substantial interstate activity was contem-
plated.52
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Burke County Public
Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership53 was one of
the courts to follow Judge Lumbard's reasoning in adopting the
"contemplation of the parties" test.
The Burke case involved a multi-state architectural firm
which entered a contract with the Burke County Public School
Board to design two school buildings. The school board sued the
firm when leaks were discovered in one of the buildings. The
firm pointed out that the contract contained an arbitration
agreement," filed a demand for arbitration, arid moved for a
stay of litigation pending arbitration. Once the case reached the
court of appeals, the dispositive issue was whether the contract
evidenced a transaction involving commerce within the meaning
of the FAA.55 The court of appeals held that it did not evi-
dence such a transaction, even though the contractual provi-
52. Id. at 386-87.
53. 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981).
54. The arbitration agreement provided that
all claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of... this
Agreement or the breach thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accor-
dance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association then obtaining. This agreement so to arbitrate




UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1499
sions indicated that the parties contemplated substantial inter-
state activity.56 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
following the reasoning of Judge Lumbard in Metro that what
was contemplated by the parties shall decide whether the con-
tract evidences a transaction involving commerce.57
The court held that the undisputed facts necessitated a find-
ing that the parties contemplated substantial interstate activity
and, therefore, evidenced a transaction involving commerce
within the FAA.5" The court, relying on Judge Lumbard's
statement that "evidence as to how parties expected the con-
tract to be performed and how it was performed is relevant to
whether substantial interstate activity was contemplated," 9
developed its own standard for applying section 2 of the FAA to
contracts. It held that "[wihere . .. performance of the contract
itself necessarily involves, so that the parties to the agreement
must have contemplated, substantial interstate activity the
contract evidences a transaction involving commerce within the
meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act."6" The facts applied to
this standard established the interstate connection between the
Indiana architectural firm and the North Carolina school board.
From these facts the court concluded that "the parties in mak-
ing the contract contemplated substantial interstate activity."61
56. Id. at 819.
57. Id. at 822-23.
58. The court stated that "there could be no doubt that the contract in question
contemplated substantial interstate activity." Burke, 279 S.E.2d at 822. It listed the
relevant evidence as:
The contract, a standard form agreement between owner and architect,
states that it is between "Burke County (North Carolina) Public Schools
Board of Education" and "Shaver & Company, a Partnership." Further, it
specifically lists Lee J. Brockway as one of the principal architects and
describes the project as being the construction of two high schools and
other education facilities. Although the address of Shaver & Company is
not given in the agreement between owner and architect, it is listed as
follows on the standard form agreement between owner and contractor:
"The Architect for this project is Shaver and Company, Lee J. Brockway,
Architect, 105 Washington Street, Michigan City, Indiana." Further, the
agreement between owner and contractor makes clear that the con-
struction site of the high schools is Burke County.
Id. at 418-19.
59. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387
(1961).
60. Burke, 279 S.E.2d at 822.
61. Id. at 823.
1508
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The decision in Burke was followed in other courts as well.
As recently as 1993, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia followed Burke and expressly adopt-
ed the reasoning of Judge Lumbard in Metro.2 The Supreme
Court of Alabama also followed the Burke decision and adopted
the "contemplation of the parties" test as the appropriate stan-
dard to determine if section 2 of the FAA applies to arbitration
agreements.63 This interpretation, however, created the dispute
regarding section 2 applicability which invited the United
States Supreme Court to review Allied-Bruce Terminix.
2. The "Commerce-in-Fact" Test
Although the "contemplation of the parties" test was enthusi-
astically adopted by a number of courts, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1984 decided
Snyder v. Smith" and established the "commerce-in-fact" test.
This case was to become one of the most cited decisions em-
ploying this test.65 The case involved a partnership among
62. Lacheney v. Profitkey Intl, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 922, 924 (1993). The court
followed the North Carolina Supreme Court in Burke, adopting Judge Lumbard's rea-
soning.
63. Warren v. Jim Skinner Ford, Inc., 548 So. 2d 157 (Ala. 1989). This case in-
volved the purchase of a car. The sales agreement contained the following provisions:
1. That the motor vehicle described in this sale document has been
heretofore traveling in interstate commerce and has an impact upon in-
terstate commerce.
2. That in the event any dispute(s) under the terms of this con-
tract of sale arise . . . the purchaser agree[s] to submit such dispute(s)
to binding arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
and according to the commercial rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation then existing in Birmingham, Alabama.
Id. at 158. The court stated that "the appropriate standard for making [a determina-
tion that the FAA applies] is set forth in a special opinion in Metro Industrial Paint-
ing Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co." Id. at 159. From the facts of the case, the
court held that the parties did not contemplate substantial interstate activity in the
retail sale of the car manufactured outside Alabama but sold in Alabama by an Ala-
bama company to Alabama residents who were buying the car as consumers and not
for commercial reasons. Id.
64. 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1984).
65. Strickland, supra note 3, at 417. Interestingly, this case was not cited in the
United States Supreme Court's argument in adopting the "commerce-in-fact" test.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). Actually, the majority did
not cite any cases to support its holding on this issue.
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three Illinois residents to purchase property in Texas. The part-
nership agreement contained an arbitration provision signed by
all three partners.66 When one of the partners subsequently
died, a dispute arose between the two remaining partners con-
cerning the purchase price of the deceased's interest. Their dis-
pute reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit. In addressing the issue of applicability of the
FAA, the court excluded a review of "maritime transactions"
and narrowed the issue to "whether the partnership agreement
evidence[d] a transaction involving commerce."67 Considering
prior Supreme Court decisions and the "strong federal policy
favoring arbitration,"" the court decided that the FAA applies
to all arbitration agreements which involve commerce; when
deciding which contracts involve commerce, courts should take
into account Congress' broad power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause.69
However, Snyder has been cited in a number of other decisions that follow its
reasoning. In Weatherly Cellaphonics Partners v. Hueber, 726 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C.
1989), the court cited Snyder to support the proposition that the "involving commerce"
language of section 2 is "co-extensive with Congress' power under the commerce
clause to reach activities affecting interstate commerce." Id. at 323. In Mutual Rein-
surance Bureau v. Great Plains Mutual Insurance Co., 750 F. Supp. 455 (D. Kan.
1990), the court cited Snyder to establish that "the strong policy favoring arbitra-
tion . . . [requires that] involving commerce . .. be construed broadly." Id. at 462
(citing Snyder, 736 F.2d at 417).
66. The arbitration agreement stated, in part, that
[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or
to the interpretation, breach or enforcement thereof, shall be submitted to
three arbitrators and settled by arbitration in the city of Houston, Tex-
as, . . . provided, however,... if the matter submitted to arbitration
shall involve a [dispute] as to the [purchase price] of a deceased, ...
Partner's Entire Partnership Interest, such arbitration shall be held be-
fore three arbitrators, one of whom shall be a certified public accountant
and the other two of whom shall be licensed real estate appraisers main-
taining offices and doing business in Harris County, Texas .... Any
award made by any majority of the Arbitrators shall be final, binding,
and conclusive on all parties hereto for all purposes, and a judgment
may be enforced thereon in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Snyder, 736 F.2d at 412-13.
67. Id. at 417.
68. Id. (citing Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Man-
agement and Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 867 (1st Cir. 1981)).
69. Id. at 418. The court stated that "Congress intended the FAA to apply to all
contracts that it constitutionally could regulate." Id.
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The court assembled a line of United States Supreme Court
and lower court cases to reach this conclusion. It started with
the premise that "[slection 2 is a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"' which
requires that "any questions as to whether an issue is arbitra-
ble are to be resolved in favor of arbitration."'" Therefore, the
appeals court reasoned, the requirement of "evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce" must be construed broadly.72
The Seventh Circuit supported its "broad interpretation"
reasoning with a number of United States Supreme Court deci-
sions. It began with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.,73  in which the Supreme Court noted
Congress' intent to apply the FAA "not only [to] the actual
physical interstate shipment of goods but also [to] contracts re-
lating to interstate commerce." 4 Next, the court referred to
the holding in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.," where the Su-
preme Court held that the contract in dispute did not "involve
commerce" because Bernhardt was not "working in commerce,
producing goods in commerce, or engaging in activity that af-
fected commerce." 6 The Seventh Circuit also relied on the Su-
preme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating" which
"equated the breadth of 'involving commerce' with the extent of
70. Id. at 417, (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
74. Id. at 401-02, n.7, (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)).
The House Report stated in relevant part that:
[the FAA] declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced
by the courts of the United States. The remedy is founded also upon the
Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty. The control
over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate
shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce.
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
75. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
76. Snyder v. Smith, 736 P.2d 409, 417 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). The
court borrowed this language from the Bernhardt decision where the Supreme Court
stated that there was "no showing that petitioner while performing his duties under
the employment contract was working 'n' commerce, was producing goods for com-
merce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our
decisions." Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01.
77. 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
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Congress's power to regulate under the commerce clause.""
Finally, the court brought its reasoning full circle by stating
that "[ulnder the commerce clause, Congress may reach activi-
ties 'affecting' interstate commerce."'' 9 Therefore, if the "involv-
ing commerce" language is as broad as Congress' Commerce
Clause authority, and Congress may reach activities "affecting"
interstate commerce under its Commerce Clause authority,
then, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, it was logical to conclude
that any contract "affecting" interstate commerce falls within
section 2 of the FAA."°
There are a number of cases that have reached similar con-
clusions without citing Snyder or expanding their reasoning
beyond Snyder's logical conclusion. In Raytheon Co. v. Automat-
ed Business Systems"' the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit applied the FAA to an arbitration agreement
in a contract that "affected interstate commerce."12 In Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Industrial Y Commercial v. Inter-
national Standard Electric Corp.,3 the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated that the FAA applies "where contractual activity
facilitates, affects, or arises out of interstate or foreign com-
merce."' In GAF Corp. v. Werner,85 the same court held that
the FAA applied to an arbitration clause in an employment
agreement "since the employment agreement affects interstate
commerce."86 These cases make it clear that the "commerce-in-
fact" test is not burdensome to meet.
3. Difficulty with Two Different Tests
Under both the "contemplation of the parties" test and the
"commerce-in-fact" test, courts apply the facts of the case to
determine whether arbitration agreements are enforceable un-
78. Snyder, 736 U.S. at 418.
79. Id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276-77 (1981)).
80. Id.
81. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
83. 490 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1985).
84. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
85. 484 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1985).
86. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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der the FAA. Neither test offends the basic principle of the
FAA to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements. However,
there is a difficulty in having two tests: when two. different
standards are applied to the same statute, parties may be sub-
ject to differing results under the same or similar factual situa-
tions. If the court employs the "commerce-in-fact" test, the pro-
ponent of FAA application will find it very simple to show that
a contract evidenced a transaction involving commerce. Since
"involving commerce" is "co-extensive" with Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause, almost all transactions in goods
may be encompassed by section 2 of the FAA under the "com-
merce-in-fact" test." However, if a court employs the "contem-
plation of the parties" test, it will be more difficult for the par-
ty proposing arbitration to show that the parties colntemplated
substantial interstate activity.
Congress' intent in enacting the FAA was to ensure the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements and decrease the burdens
of litigation.88 It would seem counterproductive to allow con-
flicting standards to exist. A given case could theoretically be
decided differently depending on where the suit is brought. In
addition, differing standards invite litigation to determine which
standard is correct. This was the case in Allied-Bruce Terminix.
However, before the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision can be
meaningfully analyzed, a review of the prior United States
Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying section 2 of the
FAA must be conducted.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FAA § 2 ANALYSIS
Since the FAA was enacted, courts have attempted to inter-
pret its applicability, the scope by which it was enacted, the
breadth of its reach, and the preemptive powers of its various
sections over state law. The Supreme Court has consistently
taken opportunities to increase the importance of the FAA re-
garding these critical issues.89 However, before it could reach a
87. See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418 (7th Cir. 1984).
88. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1985); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
89. See infra part III.A-G.
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decision regarding the scope of section 2 and the standard prop-
erly used to determine its applicability, the Court needed to
establish the basic tenets of the FAA itself. In Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America ° the Court found the opportunity
to begin that process.
A. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America"
In Bernhardt, the Supreme Court began clarifying the scope
of section 2 of the FAA. The case addressed a federal district
court's denial of a motion for a stay of proceedings according to
section 3 of the FAA92 despite the existence of a written arbi-
tration agreement between the parties.93 The case involved an
employment contract made while Bernhardt was a New York
resident. He later became a resident of Vermont and was to
perform the duties of the contract in that state. The contract
contained a provision stating that if a dispute arose, the parties
would submit the dispute to arbitration under New York law by
the American Arbitration Association. The Court further stated
that any of the Association's determinations would be "final and
absolute."94 When a dispute did arise Bernhardt filed charges
in Vermont state court for damages incurred from his discharge
under the contract. The case was removed to the federal district
court due to diversity of citizenship. Polygraphic then filed a
motion to stay the proceedings so the controversy could be arbi-
trated, but the district court denied the motion.95
90. 350 U.S. 198 (1955).
91. Id.
92. Section 3 provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing for such arbitration, the court in which the suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitra-
tion.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
93. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 199-200.




The Supreme Court held that the denial of the motion was
not in error because section 3, which requires a stay of litiga-
tion pending arbitration, does not apply unless the contract or
transaction satisfies section 2.96 Accordingly, the Court re-
viewed the requirements of section 2 and found that no mari-
time action was involved and that the contract did not evidence
"a transaction involving commerce."97
An important note to the decision is Justice Douglas' implica-
tion that the FAA's "evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce" requirement can be satisfied by showing that the pe-
titioner "was working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for
commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected com-
merce.""8 This implication has been used by the current Court
to support the contention that the FAA should be construed
broadly.99
Although Bernhardt shed light on the scope of section 2, it
did not address the authority upon which it was enacted. The
Court did not directly address "whether arbitration touched on
substantive rights ... or was a mere form of procedure within
the power of the federal courts or Congress to prescribe."0 0
Justice Thomas, dissenting in Allied-Bruce Terminix, posits that
Bernhardt shows that, for Erie purposes, the question of wheth-
er a court could stay litigation brought in breach of an arbitra-
tion agreement is one of substantive law.' The Bernhardt
96. Id. at 202 ("We conclude that the stay provided in § 3
reaches only those contracts covered by §§ 1 and 2.")
97. Id. at 200.
98. Id. at 201.
99. Justice Berger relied upon this language in Allied-Bruce Terminix where he
held that the FAA should be interpreted broadly to extend the Act's reach to the
limits of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. 115 S. Ct at 837-43. Justice Breyer
equated "involving" commerce with "affecting" commerce. Id. at 840-41. When Con-
gress uses the word "affecting," it usually intends that the statute employ the full
limits of congressional power. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)
(1988); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
100. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202. The critical issue is whether the FAA is based
upon the commerce power of the U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, or the power of Con-
gress to prescribe procedural rules for Federal Courts under art. III, § 1. Since the
Court did not decide, it remained a matter of statutory interpretation, legislative
interpretation, and conjecture.
101. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., 115 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas J., dissenting); see also
Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203-04 (stating that "[t]he change from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.").
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Court avoided the issue by reading section 3 of the FAA nar-
rowly, holding that section 3 does not apply on its own." 2
B. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.'
The silence regarding congressional authority upon which the
FAA rested was broken in Prima Paint. This case involved
Prima Paint's claim of "fraud in the inducement" against Flood
& Conklin. Prima Paint contracted to purchase Flood &
Conklin's paint business. The contract contained a broad arbi-
tration clause."M A dispute arose between the parties and Pri-
ma Paint notified Flood & Conklin that they had violated the
agreement."5 Flood & Conklin then served notice of intention
to arbitrate and Prima Paint filed a federal diversity suit to
rescind the agreement. The district court granted Flood &
Conklin's motion to stay the action pending arbitration, and the
court of appeals dismissed Prima Paint's appeal of that deci-
sion. "'06
This case presented a problem that had not yet been ad-
dressed in previous FAA cases. °7 In Erie Railroad Co. v.
102. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202; see supra note 92 for the language of section 3.
103. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
104. Id. at 398. The clause read in part: "Any controversy or claim arising out of
or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
the City of New York, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American
Arbitration Association. . . ." Id.
105. Prima Paint proceeded upon the theory that since there was "fraud" in the
inducement to enter into the contract, the entire contract should be rescinded. Id. at
399. This, they argued, would comport with the FAA in that section 2 states that an
arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. at 400 (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1988)) (emphasis added). The Court held that since the claim of fraud re-
lates to the contract as a whole, and not to the arbitration agreement itself, the
denial of Prima Paint's appeal should be affirmed. Id. at 406. Therefore, since there
was no evidence that Flood & Conklin fraudulently induced Prima Paint to enter into
the agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising under the contract, the Court of
Appeals decision was affirmed. Id. at 407.
106. 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. Due to the holdings of Erie and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), "federal courts are bound in diversity cases to follow state rules of decision in
matters which are 'substantive' rather than 'procedural,' or where the matter is 'out-
come determinative.' Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05. Bernhardt avoided this issue
by not deciding "whether section 2 creates a federal right or whether the [holding]
extends to diversity cases involving section 2 contracts." Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and
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Tompkins... the Supreme Court held that a federal court sit-
ting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in
which it sits.' 9 This posed a problem for the Court in Prima
Paint. To apply the FAA, the Court would have to determine
whether it was substantive law or procedural law. If procedur-
al, the FAA would not be applicable due to the holding in Erie.
If substantive, the Court could apply the FAA to this case but
would have to substantiate its decision with a definitive
statement listing supporting evidence. Such a definitive state-
ment had not been made by the Court in any prior decision.
In the Court's discussion regarding the applicability of the
FAA, Justice Fortas boldly stated that "it is clear beyond dis-
pute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over
interstate commerce and over admiralty.'"" Thus, the poten-
tial Erie problem was solved by changing the focus from rules
of procedure to commerce clause authority, thereby avoiding the
problem of federal substantive rules governing diversity
cases."'
Discussing the "involving commerce" requirement of section 2,
Justice Fortas again boldly stated that "[t]here could not be a
clearer case of a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate
commerce."" 2 However, in making this decree, he failed to de-
fine the standard by which he concluded the contract evidenced
a transaction "involving commerce.""' Therefore, the Court
Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies, and a
Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 849 (1960).
108. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
109. Id.
110. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924)). But see id. at 418-19 (Black, J., dissenting) ("One cannot
read the legislative history without concluding that [Congress' power to prescribe the
jurisdiction and duties of the Federal Courts], and not Congress' power to legislate in
the area of commerce, was the 'principal basis' of the Act.")
111. The Prima Paint Court stated that instead of addressing the issue of
"whether Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern questions arising
in simple diversity cases," the Court was now addressing "whether Congress may
prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter
over which Congress plainly has power to legislate." Id. at 405.
112. Id. at 401.
113. Instead of stating a general rule to define this requirement, Justice Fortas
offered very fact specific evidence of the agreement entered into by the parties. See
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applied little more than a factual summary of the agreement in
question to satisfy the requirement,"4 leaving future courts to
decide the appropriate standard to apply.
One possibility for the lapse was simply that the Court chose
not to address the issue (or did not see a need to address the
issue) of a standard of FAA applicability to contracts. Another
possibility is that Justice Fortas was indirectly confirming a
"commerce-in-fact" test."5 By stating that the mere existence
of goods involving interstate commerce-without mentioning
any other requirement for application of the FAA-was suffi-
cient to warrant application of the FAA, it can be speculated
that this liberal "commerce-in-fact" standard is the appropriate
standard. However, the Court did not take a position on the
issue.
C. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Co.
116
Although Prima Paint established that the FAA was substan-
tive law to be applied in federal court, the Court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether the FAA should be applied in a state
court proceeding. Given the Court's admission that the FAA
was enacted under the "federal foundations of 'control over
interstate commerce,""' 7 the Court had to decide whether con-
tracts disputed in state courts were beyond the reach of the
FAA. In Moses H. Cone, the Court addressed this issue and
found that the FAA would apply to state court proceedings.1
Moses H. Cone Memorial was a hospital located in North
Carolina that entered into a contract for the construction of
additions to its facilities."9 The company they chose to com-
plete the work was Mercury Construction, a firm based in Ala-
bama.20 The contract between the hospital and Mercury con-
id. at 401, n.6.
114. Id.
115. See supra part II.C.2.
116. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
117. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
118. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 27.




tained provisions for dispute resolution.'2 It stated that all
disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance
of the contract should be referred to the architectural firm
hired by the hospital to oversee the project. 1 2 The contract
further stated that any dispute decided by the architectural
firm, or not decided by it within a stated period of time, could
be submitted by either party to binding arbitration.'
Mercury'claimed it suffered delay and impact costs as a re-
sult of hospital delay and inaction. Although Mercury tried to
get the hospital to pay these costs, the hospital refused to pay
and sued.' The hospital filed its suit in state court to obtain
a stay of arbitration.' Mercury filed suit in federal court
seeking an order compelling arbitration under section 4 of the
FAA. 6 The hospital then made a motion in district court to
stay the federal court suit because identical issues were being
argued and the district court granted the stay. 7 Mercury
sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
and the court reversed the stay and remanded the case back to
district court with instructions for entry of an order to arbi-
trate." The hospital appealed that decision to the United
States Supreme Court."
In relevant part, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
held that the district court's stay "frustrated the statutory poli-
cy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agree-
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5. The arbitration clause contained in the contract read:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of,
or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof, . . .shall be decided
by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the
parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement to arbitrate shall be
specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law. The award
rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered
upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.
Id.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id.
126. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
127. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7.
128. Id. at 8.
129. Id.
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ments."" ° The Court reiterated the holding in Prima Paint
that the FAA was a body of federal substantive law applicable
to arbitration agreements covered by the Act."' In addressing
the question of arbitrability and section 2, the Court held that
there exists "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary," and
that the issues here were arbitrable."'
This language in the holding, affirming Prima Paint's broad
interpretation of the FAA, offered nothing dramatically differ-
ent. However, Justice Brennan proceeded in the, opinion to take
steps towards a radical interpretation of the FAA. In dicta, he
interpreted the FAA's ambiguous language in section 3, refer-
ring to the FAA's application in "any of the courts of the Unit-
ed States."33 He held that "state courts, as much as federal
courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the
Arbitration Act."" This, he added, was in accordance with
the practices of the state courts themselves, who "have almost
unanimously recognized that the stay provision of § 3 applies to
suits in state as well as federal courts.""35 For the first time,
the Court held that sections of the FAA were to be applied in
state court as well as federal court. The necessity for this find-
ing, as stated by the Court, was to "carry out Congress' intent
to mandate enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements;
Congress can hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate
can be enforced against a party who attempts to litigate an
arbitrable dispute in federal court, but not against one who
sues on the same dispute in state court.""5
130. Id. at 23.
131. Id. at 24 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 26, n.34.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 26, n.34. Interestingly, the case chosen for support of this point was
Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816
(1981). As discussed above, see part II.C.l., Burke has been relied upon in other
courts to support the argument that the appropriate test for determining the applica-
bility of the FAA is the "contemplation of the parties" test. It is unlikely that Justice
Brennan could have foreseen the controversy surrounding the holding of that case.
136. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26, n.34.
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Section 2 was not directly addressed, but by applying the
holding in Bernhardt that section 3 of the FAA was not applica-
ble until section 2 is satisfied, section 2 should have been found
applicable in state court proceedings as well. However, the
Court was silent as to the appropriate standard by which appli-
cability should be decided. Despite the fact that the Court's
opinion about the FAA's applicability was placed in dicta, the
foundation was set for a decision to expressly hold that sections
of the FAA apply in state and federal court. It would take only
eleven months for the Court to seize upon this opportunity in
Southland Corp. v. Keating."'
D. Southland Corp. v. Keating'3
In Southland, the Court reaffirmed its prior holdings 39 and
stated that section 2 is a substantive statute derived from the
Commerce Clause.' In this case, several franchisees, includ-
ing Mr. Keating, brought suit against the franchisor, Southland
Corporation, for violating several laws in addition to a violation
of the California Franchise Investment Law.141 The contracts
the franchisees had signed contained an arbitration agree-
ment.12 Southland moved to compel arbitration of the claims
pursuant to the arbitration agreement and the FAA.' 3 The
California Supreme Court refused to compel arbitration because
it interpreted the state investment law to provide for judicial
consideration of claims brought under it.'4
Once establishing that the FAA was enacted under Com-
merce Clause authority,' . the Supreme Court proceeded to
determine that the clause's broad power afforded Congress the
137. 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
138. Id.
139. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1
(1982); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
140. Southland, 465 U.S. at 11.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. The Arbitration Agreement read in part: "Any controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitra-
tion ... and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction thereof." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id. at 11.
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ability to broaden the application of substantive rules to govern
commerce.' Chief Justice Burger left his mark upon the FAA
by writing for a Supreme Court which held for the first time
that the broad Commerce Clause power requires that section 2
of the FAA be applied to state courts as well as federal
courts.' 7 Relying on the Court's prior decision in Prima Paint,
he reasoned that when Congress exercises Commerce Clause
authority to enact substantive federal law, "it normally creates
rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal
courts."' And in so doing, "Congress intended to foreclose
state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbi-
tration agreements."4 4 Thus, the state law in question was
found to violate the Supremacy Clause 5 ' because of its direct
conflict with section 2 of the FAA, and was preempted.1
5 1
The Court did not address the FAA's "evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce" requirement.152 However, Chief Jus-
tice Burger incorporated the "involving commerce" language into
his rationale that the FAA is applicable to state courts. He rea-
soned that if Congress' intention was to apply the FAA to state
courts, it would need to proceed under the Commerce
Clause.' 5 ' Therefore, the "involving commerce" language was
"a necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in
146. Id. at 12.
147. Id. at 12-16. Justice Thomas pointed out in Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. that
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959),
was the first time a federal court held that § 2 applied to state courts. 115 S. Ct. at
845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court first presented the idea that the
FAA was applicable to state courts in Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Const. Co.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983). However, this language was dicta in that it was not necessary for
the decision of the case. Id. at 25-26.
148. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 420).
149. Id. at 16.
150. The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby...." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2. In this case, it was proposed that the FAA was enacted pursu-
ant to the Constitution through the Commerce Clause.
151. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
152. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
153. Southland, 465 U.S. at 14. For Congress to prescribe law applicable to state
courts, it must proceed under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See supra
part II.B.
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state and federal courts."" It was not "an inexplicable limita-
tion on the power of the federal courts," as those who ques-
tioned the determination that the FAA is based on the com-
merce powers of Congress argued.'55
Southland was met with skepticism by its dissenting Justic-
es 56 and commentators alike.'57 Whether the Court would
take the opportunity to reverse or clarify the Southland holding
was soon answered with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Ch7ysler-Plymouth, Inc.'58 in 1985.
E. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.
5 9
The Mitsubishi case involved a suit filed by Mitsubishi
against Soler Chrysler-Plymouth for a number of alleged dam-
ages and breaches of a sales agreement. 6 ' Mitsubishi and
Soler entered into a dealership agreement and sales agreement
providing for sales of Mitsubishi vehicles in certain designated
areas.' The sales agreement contained an arbitration clause
providing that all disputes arising out of certain articles of the
agreement, or breach thereof, would be arbitrated by the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association.'62  Although first year
154. Id. at 14-15.
155. Id, at 14. It is likely that Chief Justice Burger was referring to Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in which she characterized the decision as "inexplica-
ble." Id. at 36.
156. Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 21
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
157. See Carlos R. Carrasquillo, Commercial Arbitration: Southland Corp. V.
Keating-Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act Preempts State Law in the Field of
Commercial Arbitration, 10 J. CORP. L. 767 (1985). Carrasquillo agrees with the de-
termination that the FAA applies in state and federal court but hesitates to endorse
the decision wholeheartedly. He suggests that the FAA should not entirely displace
state law providing "other remedies to vindicate section 2 rights. Thus, any procedur-
al remedies for enforcing section 2 rights in state courts should be provided for by
the state, to the extent that such procedures do not directly conflict with the purpos-
es of the FAA-" Id. at 784; see also Hirshman, supra note 15, at 1345 (noting that
the majority's opinion is not "without flaws," in that it "produces anomalous results.")
158. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 618, n.2.
161. Id. at 617.
162. The arbitration agreement provided, in part, that:
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sales were brisk, the car market evaporated and Soler request-
ed that certain agreement modifications be allowed."
Mitsubishi refused and withheld further shipment of new vehi-
cles.'4 Mitsubishi then demanded that the dispute be arbi-
trated under the terms of the agreement and pursuant to sec-
tion 4 of the FAA.'65 When the parties failed to work things
out, a complex network of motions, complaints, and counter-
complaints ensued.'66 The federal district court, in which these
motions were filed, held that the disputes were subject to arbi-
tration.167  Of particular concern to the parties was the
arbitrability of statutory antitrust claims when the agreement
from which the claims arose was drafted for an international
transaction.'6 The district court held that they were arbitra-
ble, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit affirmed this part of the decision.'69 Upon review by the
United States Supreme Court, the Court affirmed that part of
the appeals court's holding. 7 °
The Court held that in this case the statutory claim was
arbitrable under the FAA.'7' The Court set forth a two part
test for answering this question. The Court reasoned that it
must be determined whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. 72
If they did then the parties should be held to this agreement
and the parties must look to the specific statute under which
the dispute arose to determine whether there is a congressional
intent to "preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statuto-
ry rights at issue."73 In support of this test the Court cited
[aill disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of
this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbi-
tration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 618.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 619-20.
167. Id. at 620-21.
168. Id. at 621.
169. 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
170. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 627.
173. Id. at 628.
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Southland and Moses H. Cone for the proposition that arbitra-
tion agreements "must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration,"" and that courts
must rely on the congressional intent expressed in the statute
in order to determine if there are categories of claims that are
not enforceable by arbitration.' 5
The importance of the Mitsubishi decision to section 2 of the
FAA is indirect. The Court did not address whether the con-
tract "involved interstate commerce" because the subject at
issue was arbitration of statutory rights rather than a contract
clause "evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce."' 6 The relevance of Mitsubishi is the continuance
of a broad interpretation of the applicability of the FAA to a
wide array of arbitration agreements. The Court had taken new
steps in broadening the applicability of the FAA in Southland
and this affirmation strengthened the decision and the idea
that the FAA was intended to be an expansive statute to be ap-
plied liberally to contracts containing arbitration agreements.
Therefore, the Court in Mitsubishi supported the decision in
Southland and continued to expansively interpret the applica-
bility of the FAA. However, because Mitsubishi was in federal
court, the Court did not have to expressly affirm Southland's
holding that the FAA applied in state court as well as federal
court. " Such a case was soon before the Supreme Court and
it would force the Court to decide whether the Southland deci-
sion was correct or whether it could be abandoned or modified
to the point of reversal.
174. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982).
175. Southland, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1983).
176. Justice Stevens addressed this point in his dissent and found it to be disposi-
tive, contrary to the majority's opinion that it was not. He stated:
[ulntil today all of our cases enforcing agreements to arbitrate under the
Arbitration Act have involved contract claims.... But this is the first
time the Court has considered the question whether a standard arbitra-
tion clause referring to the claims arising out of or relating to a contract
should be construed to cover statutory claims that have only an indirect
relationship to the contract. In my opinion, neither the Congress that en-
acted the Arbitration Act in 1925, nor the many parties who have agreed
to such standard clauses, could have anticipated the Court's answer to
that question.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646-47.
177. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
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F. Perry v. Thomas'78
The case presented to the Supreme Court originated when
Kenneth Thomas brought suit against his former employer and
two of its employees, one of whom was Barclay Perry."9 Thom-
as sold securities for Kidder, Peabody & Co.8 ° While worldng
for them, Thomas became upset about his commissions for the
sale of securities.'8 ' Thomas alleged various breaches by Perry
and others in the company."12 Perry and the other employee
filed a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in
an employment registration form that was signed by
Thomas."s Thomas argued that California law authorized
maintaining wage collection actions despite such an agree-
ment.1"
In addressing the California Court of Appeals' affirmation of
the lower court's refusal to compel arbitration, Justice Marshall
stated that section 2 of the FAA preempts the California
statute.'85 He reiterated that section 2 is substantive law en-
acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and is enforceable in
both state and federal courts. 8 ' He therefore reinforced the
holding in Southland that section 2 preempts state statutes to
the contrary.'8 '
178. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
179. Id. at 484.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 484-85. These breaches included "breach of contract, conversion, civil
conspiracy to commit conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty." Id.
183. Id. at 485. The form was a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Regis-
tration form and contained the following provision, in part: "I agree to arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer,
or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions
or by-laws of the organizations with which I register .. " Id.
184. Id. at 486. The statute provided that actions for the collection of wages may
be maintained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate." CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 229 (West 1989).
185. Perry, 482 U.S. at 490-91.
186. Id. at 489.
187. Id. at 491. An interesting element of this case is the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stevens. Id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He stated that Congress did not
intend the FAA to preempt state law and that the courts had "rewritten" the Act to
give it this effect. Id. In Southland, however, Justice Stevens concurred with the
majority and stated that he agreed with the conclusion that "an arbitration
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Instead of abandoning the holding in Southland, the Court
strengthened it by affirming the principles stated by Chief
Justice Burger in that decision.'88  Perry secured the
Southland decision and thereby introduced the doctrine of stare
decisis that was later applied to Southland, and questioned by
both Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas in Allied-Bruce
Terminix.5 9 Perry did not discuss the FAA's "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" requirement since it was not
at issue. Justice Marshall did, however, broaden the scope of
the FAA to encompass the "full reach of the Commerce
Clause."190
G. Volt Information Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University' 91
From the history of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
breadth of the FAA, there seemed to be no practical limitations,
aside from the exclusions set forth in section 2 itself.'92 How-
ever, in Volt the Court clarified the focus of the FAA in dis-
putes involving the application of arbitration procedures that
are specifically set out in an arbitration agreement. The Court
had to weigh the liberal enforcement policy regarding arbitra-
tion agreements and the preemption of conflicting state law
against the undecided issue of whether the FAA dictates one
arbitration procedure over another.' 93
clause ... is equally enforceable if the action is brought in a state court" despite
Justice O'Connor's review of legislative history that indicated Congress enacted the
Act "as essentially procedural in nature. . . ." Southland, 465 U.S. at 17. He justified
his concurrence by reasoning that the "intervening developments in the law compel
the conclusion that the Court reached." Id. The difference that is drawn between the
two statements is that Justice Stevens, as does Justice O'Connor, believes that the
states should be given power to except certain categories of disputes from arbitration.
Perry, 482 U.S. at 494.
188. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-90.
189. Allied Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. Perry, 482 U.S. at 490.
191. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
192. Section 2 of the FAA excludes enforcement of arbitration agreements that
would otherwise be unenforceable "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
193. This issue was addressed in Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n.34. The Court
stated that section 3, although not expressly stated in the FAA, applied to state
courts since almost a majority of the state courts followed section 3 procedures. See
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Volt Information Sciences entered into a contract with the
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University for
construction of the university's electrical system.9 ' The con-
tract contained an arbitration agreement covering all disputes
"arising out of or relating to this contract or breach thereof.'95
The contract also contained a choice of law clause which provid-
ed that the contract was to be governed by the place where the
project was located.' 5
During performance of the contract, a dispute arose and Volt
demanded arbitration.'97 In response, the university filed suit
in state court, alleging fraud and breach of contract. 9 ' Volt
petitioned the court to compel arbitration under section 4 of the
FAA and to stay arbitration. The court denied Volt's petition to
compel arbitration and the California Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision, holding that the choice of law provision required
the contract be governed by California arbitration law.'99 This
statute permitted courts to stay arbitration pending resolution
of related litigation between a party to the arbitration agree-
ment and third parties not bound by it if there was a possibili-
ty of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact." °
The court followed the statute and affirmed the lower court's
decision to stay arbitration because such a situation existed
here.201 Volt submitted a petition for discretionary review with
the California Supreme Court which was denied."2 The Unit-
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
194. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.
195. The arbitration clause, as listed in the case, reads as follows:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to
this contract, arising out of or relating to this contract or breach thereof,
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction In-
dustry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then
prevailing unless the parties mutually agreed [sic] otherwise. . . . This
agreement to arbitrate . . . shall be specifically enforceable under the
prevailing arbitration law.
Id. at 470 n.1.
196. Id. at 470.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 471.
200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
201. Volt, 489 U.S. at 472.
202. Id. at 473.
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ed States Supreme Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction
and affirmed the decision. °3
The Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reiterated the holding in Moses H. Cone204 and
Mitsubishi25 that when "applying general state-law principles
of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration
agreement within the scope of the Act... due regard must be
given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities
as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor
of arbitration.""' However, the Court narrowed the reach of
the FAA in arbitration applicability in holding that the FAA's
purpose is to "ensure the enforceability, according to the terms,
of private agreements to arbitrate" and does not dictate the "set
of procedural rules" to be employed in arbitration.207 There-
fore, the Court found that the FAA did not preempt California
state law governing arbitration. The Court went on to confirm
that the FAA is a preemptive federal law that should govern
over conflicting state law "to the extent that it 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
pose and objectives of Congress' 20 8
The Court explained that the FAA, as a preemptive law, was
to apply in state courts as well as federal courts.2 9 It cited
Southland to support its statement that sections 1 and 2 of the
FAA are substantive provisions applicable to both state and
federal courts.210 However, the Court clarified the misconcep-
tion in the Moses H. Cone footnote21 ' which postulated that
section 3 also applies to state court, if not expressly, then indi-
rectly, through the practices of almost all the state courts. The
Court stated that neither section 3 nor 4 have ever been held
to be applicable to state court.2'
203. Id.
204. 460 U.S. 1 (1982).
205. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
206. Volt, 489 U.S. at 475-76.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 477 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
209. Id.
210. Southland, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1983).
211. 460 U.S. at 26 n.32 (1982); see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
212. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 n.6 (stating "we have never held that §§ 3 and 4 ...
are nonetheless applicable in state court"). The current Court, in Allied-Bruce
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H. Status of Section 2 of the FAA after Volt
After Volt, what remained of section 2 of the FAA was an act
interpreted to be substantive law, authorized by the Commerce
Clause powers delegated to Congress, applied in state and fed-
eral court, which preempted contradictory state law. The prece-
dents established a willingness on the part of the Supreme
Court to broadly interpret the FAA's section 2 language. How-
ever, much was left to be determined regarding section 2 of the
FAA that had not yet been addressed or had been left unclear
by the Court in prior decisions.
Perhaps the most basic issue never directly addressed by the
Court was the standard by which the FAA, and section 2, was
applicable to arbitration agreements. By its very language,
section 2 does not require that all arbitration agreements be
enforced. Specifically, the agreements covered are those which
are written and contained in (1) "maritime transactions," (2)
"contracts evidencing a transaction involving commerce," or (3)
agreements in writing submitting existing controversies arising
out of such contracts to arbitration.213 Since the third agree-
ment is easily identified by the fact that it involves an "existing
controversy," and the first agreement by definition is easily
defined by referring to a "maritime transaction," the Court only
had to determine what was meant by "evidencing a transaction
involving commerce." As discussed above, the Court had not
directly addressed this issue previously and the lower courts
had interpreted this language in two different ways. " There-
fore, the next step in interpreting the scope and applicability of
section 2 of the FAA was to offer a definitive standard by
which this determination could be made. The Court addressed
this issue, and revisited previously discussed issues, in Allied-
Bruce Terminix v. Dobson. 5
Terminix, did not address sections 3 and 4 and the issue of preemption. The Court
has not addressed whether these sections should be applied in state courts. Despite
their plain language references to "federal courts," the current Court thought it un-
wise to preclude their application in state courts.
213. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
214. See supra part II.C.
215. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
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IV. TEE SUPREME CoURT's ANALYSIS OF ALLIED-BRUCE
TERMINIX
By 1993, courts were interpreting the FAA broadly but were
applying differing standards to determine the applicability of
section 2 of the FAA. The Supreme Court of Alabama had
adopted the "contemplation of the parties" test and applied it to
a dispute involving a pest control company and an Alabama
homeowner.216 The case was appealed and allowed the United
States Supreme Court to directly address the issues of scope,
standards, and applicability that had been ambiguous or disput-
ed in past cases.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Allied-Bruce Terminix began when a controversy arose be-
tween the parties over a contract to inspect for and guard
against termites.217 The contract contained guarantees and
promises that Allied-Bruce Terminix would protect the house
and honor the terms of the plan.21 The plan also contained
an agreement to settle all claims or controversies "exclusively
by arbitration.""9 After closing on the purchase of their house,
at which time the contract was transferred, the Dobsons discov-
ered extensive termite infestation 2
The Dobsons sued the previous owners, Terminix, and
Terminix International, alleging fraud.' Terminix and
Terminix International moved to stay the proceedings and com-
216. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993).
217. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). The Gwins pur-
chased a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" ("Plan") for their house in Alabama from
Allied-Bruce Terminix in August, 1987. The plan was guaranteed by Terminix Inter-
national which has its principle place of business in Tennessee. Id. Terminix is a
franchise of Terminix International and is an Arkansas corporation that does business
in many states, including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas. Id.
218. Id. at 837.
219. The arbitration agreement states in part: "any controversy or claim . . .aris-
ing out of or relating to the interpretation, performance or breach of any provision of
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pel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the plan
and section 2 of the FAA. 2 The trial court denied the motion,
and Terminix and Terminix International appealed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the denial of the
motion to stay the proceedings.223 They based their holding on
an Alabama statute which makes written, pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements invalid and unenforceable.224 Although the
Alabama court recognized that arbitration agreements volun-
tarily entered into and contained in a contract that involves in-
terstate commerce preempt this state statute,2" this contract
did not meet the "involving commerce" requirement of section 2,
and the FAA did not apply.226 Employing the "contemplation
of the parties" test to evidence "a transaction involving com-
merce,"227 the court found the evidence proffered by Terminix
insufficient to "establish that the parties contemplated substan-
tial interstate activity" when they entered the plan."' In so
222. Id.
223. 628 So. 2d at 357.
224. Id. at 355. The Alabama statute, ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), states that
any agreements to forego a judicial forum through an arbitration clause is "invalid
and unenforceable."
225. Id.
226. Id. at 356-57.
227. The Alabama Supreme Court followed their recent decision that adopted the
"contemplation of the parties" standard for determining the involvement of interstate
commerce. See Ex parte Jones, 628 So. 2d 316 (Ala. 1993) (citing Ex parte Warren,
548 So. 2d 157 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989) (citing Metro Indus.
Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 817 (1961))). The Metro court held that in determining the involvement of inter-
state commerce "[t]he significant question, therefore, is not whether, in carrying out
the terms of the contract, the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time
they entered into it and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated substan-
tial interstate activity." 278 F.2d at 387 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). In adopting this
standard, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected their prior holding which established
a "slightest nexus" standard. See Ex parte Costa & Head (Atrium), Ltd., 486 So. 2d
1272 (Ala. 1986); see also Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984) (7th Cir. 1984). By adopting the "contemplation" standard, the Alabama Su-
preme Court condoned the
result ... that a party unable to prove his contracting partner's state of
mind at the time the parties entered into the contract will not be able to
avail himself of the arbitration process in Alabama even though both
parties signed a contract agreeing to submit their disputes to just such
an arbitration tribunal.
Thomas D. Applewhite, Ex parte Jones: But did you Contemplate Substantial Inter-
state Activity?, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1423, 1428 (1994).
228. 628 So. 2d at 356. In its holding, the court reviewed the evidence presented
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holding, the court limited the scope of the FAA and raised
questions about how to apply the Act. Thus, the issue presented
to the United States Supreme Court was whether section 2 of
the FAA "should be read broadly, extending the Act's reach to
the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power? Or do...
'involving' and 'evidencing' ... significantly restrict the Act's
application?"229
B. The Majority Opinion
In delivering the opinion for the majority, Justice Breyer held
that section 2 should be read broadly to extend the Act's reach
to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power.23 In so
doing, he explained the scope of "involving commerce" and de-
clared that the "commerce-in-fact" test is to be the standard by
which a party evidences a transaction involving commerce."'
Justice Breyer laid the groundwork for the opinion by relying
on past precedent to state that "the basic purpose of the [FAA]
is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbi-
by Terminix. Id. at 356-57. First, the fact that the bond stated it was executed in
Tennessee was held not to be determinative in that it was insufficient merely to
show that one or more parties to the contract were located in another state. Id. The
court also considered the language in the plan stating it was subject to federal regu-
lation. This was also deemed insufficient to show that the parties contemplated sub-
stantial interstate activity, particularly because it did not put the parties on notice of
the likelihood of such activity. Id. Terminix also offered evidence that Gwin, the origi-
nal owner of the house, stated he wanted to go with a "national" company. The court
attributed this comment to the desire to gain the security associated with large com-
panies, and not contemplation of substantial interstate activity. Id. The final piece of
evidence proffered was the theory that interstate supplies would be required for per-
formance of the bond obligations. Although some construction contracts would suffice
under this theory, the court decided this contract did not because the interstate activ-
ity involved was not "so great that it cannot reasonably be said that the parties
failed to contemplate substantial interstate activity when they entered into the con-
tract.L" Id. Without directly addressing the issue, the court implied that "some materi-
als used in fulfilling the bond obligations may have come from out-of-state suppliers"
is not "substantial" enough to satisfy the "substantial interstate activity" requirement
for the test. Id.
229. 115 S. Ct. at 836.
230. 115 S. Ct. at 838-43.
231. Id. at 838 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (The "basic purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act is to overcome courts refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate"));
see also Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that the Act is
based upon the Commerce Clause powers of Congress).
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trate.""2 He then reiterated the conclusion that the FAA is
not based upon Congress' power to "ordain and establish" fed-
eral courts,233  but rather is based on the Commerce
Clause." 4 He concluded the groundwork with the affirmation
of Southland's holding that the FAA preempts state law, and
that state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate
arbitration agreements."' With these three legal background
items presented, Justice Breyer defended the Southland deci-
sion. Despite the insistence of Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas,
Dobson, and twenty state attorneys general to the contrary, the
Court reaffirmed that the holding in Southland was correct and
would not be overruled.35
Justice Breyer offered four reasons why the decision would
not be overturned. First, the Southland Court considered simi-
lar arguments against preemption but decided that the FAA
preempted state law to the contrary.3 7 Secondly, he stated
that "nothing significant" had happened since Southland.'
He offered two examples of situations, the absence of which
might be considered significant. The first was that no later
cases had eroded the Southland authority.239 To the contrary,
Perry and Volt both reaffirmed the Southland holding.2' He
also noticed that no unforeseen practical problems had arisen,
but did not define what they might have been. 24 1 His third
reason why the Court would not overrule Southland was that
private parties had written contracts relying on the holding in
Southland.42 His final reason was that Congress had passed
legislation extending the scope of arbitration.24 3 To support
this reason, Justice Breyer referred to 9 U.S.C. § 15 which
232. 115 S. Ct. at 836.
233. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
234. 115 S. Ct. at 838, (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395, 405 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924))).
235. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1983)).




240. See Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).





eliminated the Act of State doctrine as a bar to arbitration, and
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 regarding international arbitration.2
The majority then proceeded to the two basic interpretive
questions. The Court's answers to these questions established
that section 2 of the FAA should be read broadly to extend the
Federal Arbitration Act's reach to the limits of Congress' Com-
merce Clause power.245
1. The Scope of Section 2's "Involving Commerce" Language
The Court first addressed the interpretive question regarding
section 2's "involving commerce" language. The Court held that
the "involving commerce" language signals the full exercise of
the Commerce Clause's constitutional power.246 This holding
was premised upon the idea that "involving commerce" should
be interpreted as broadly as "affecting commerce" which nor-
mally signals full exercise of Commerce Clause power. 47
To reach this conclusion, Justice Breyer presented a strong
argument that relied upon simple statutory and judicial inter-
pretation. Justice Breyer first turned to the language of other
federal statutes that used "involving commerce" to discern the
meaning intended in the FAA. Surprisingly, there are no other
statutes that use the word "involving" to describe an interstate
commerce relation.' He then turned to the dictionary defini-
tion of "involve" which incorporated "affect" into its defini-
tion. 9 Strengthening his argument, he proceeded to show
that through the FAA's legislative history Congress intended
such an expansive interpretation.25 ° He reiterated the "expan-
sive legislative intent" as evidenced by the excerpts taken from
244. Id.
245. Id. at 841.
246. Id.
247. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988); National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988).
248. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 839. (The Act's "control over interstate
commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also
contracts relating to interstate commerce.").
249. Id. (citing V Oxford English Dictionary 466 (1st ed. 1933) "providing examples
dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, where 'involve' means to 'include or af-
fect . . . in operation").
250. Id.
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the Congressional Record. The House Report stated that the
Act's "control over interstate commerce reaches not only the
actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts
relating to interstate commerce."251 In addition, the majority
restated Representative Graham's comments that the Act "af-
fects contracts relating to interstate subjects and contracts in
admiralty." 2 In support of its position, the Court presented
the fact that section 1 of the FAA defines "commerce" "in the
language of the Commerce Clause itself."
253
Perhaps the strongest argument the Court made came from
its review of past precedent and the basic purpose of the Act.
Past precedent established that the Act's reach "coincided with
that of the Commerce Clause."25 ' The Court noted that the
holdings had not been overruled. The purpose of the Act, as
Justice Breyer stated, was to "put arbitration provisions on 'the
same footing' as a contract's other terms."25 The Court rea-
soned that limiting the language "involving commerce" would
create a "new, unfamiliar test" that would create litigation from
the very statute that was enacted to avoid litigation.256 This
pointed to the conclusion that "involving" should be given the
same meaning as "affecting." Support for the majority's position
also prevailed in Bernhardt,5 7 which seemed to define "involv-
ing commerce" in a similar fashion.258 Based on this support,
the Court held that the language of the FAA's section 2 should
be interpreted broadly.5 9 "Involving commerce" was not in-
251. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
252. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924). Representative Graham of Pennsylvania submitted
the report on, and was the primary proponent of the FAA. His report was heavily
relied upon by the Court in this decision and prior holdings to discern legislative
intent.
253. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 840.
254. Id. at 840 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 490 (1987); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983); Prima Paint v. Floyd & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 407
(1967)).
255. 115 S. Ct. at 840, (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511
(1974)).
256. Id. The Court's position on this subject could also have been supported by
Congressman Graham's assurances to Congress that the Act would not create any
.new principle of law" or "new legislation." 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924).
257. 350 U.S. 198 (1955).
258. See supra notes 98-93, see also Cohen, supra note 4, at 277.
259. 115 S. Ct. at 840.
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tended to create a "new, unfamiliar test" but could reasonably
be interpreted to coincide with "affecting commerce."26 °
2. Standard to Determine Applicability of Section 2 of the FAA
The second interpretive question involved the "evidencing a
transaction" language 1.2 " The Court recognized the difficulty in
choosing an interpretation,262 but decided that the "commerce-
in-fact" test should be chosen as the definitive standard by
which to apply the FAA. The Court found the "commerce-in-
fact" test "more faithful to the statute" than the "contemplation
of the parties" test.263 In so holding, Justice Breyer reasoned
that the "contemplation" test is "anomalous" to the Act's basic
purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements and avoiding un-
necessary litigation.2" The subjective nature of the "contem-
plation" test, he noted, would undoubtably result in additional
litigation regarding what was, or was not, "contemplated."2
The resulting litigation would be contrary to the purpose of the
Act.266 The Court further reasoned that the "contemplation"
test would place the validity of an arbitration agreement upon
the "happenstance" that the parties would actually mention
interstate commerce when entering the contract or add a refer-
ence to interstate commerce.2 7 It was also noted that the
"contemplation" test would make unenforceable the provision of
section 2 that covers "an agreement in writing to submit to ar-




261. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).






268. Id- at 842 (emphasis added). If such a test was allowed, as Justice Breyer
noted, an arbitration agreement made after the parties entered into the contract
could potentially be passed over for FAA application. Id This seems to fly in the face
of congressional intent to enforce arbitration agreements. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924). Further, nothing in the legislative history suggests that
such a result should occur since the arbitration agreements discussed were not quali-
fied, with the exception that they be in writing and be contained in "any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2
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Following this reasoning, the Court stated that the "com-
merce-in-fact" test is permitted by the statute's language.269
Not only did that interpretation avoid the anomalous effects
listed above, but Justice Breyer held that it was in accord with
the language of the statute and the legislative history2 70
Therefore, despite one minor interpretive issue,"' the "com-
merce-in-fact" test was deemed the most "faithful" to the FAA
and was adopted by the Court.2
C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The remaining justices disagreed with the majority's holding
that the FAA applies to state courts.27 Justice O'Connor,
while supporting Justice Breyer in his analysis of the language
"involving commerce" and "evidencing a transaction," disagreed
with the majority's summarization of Congress' intent. 4 Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Thomas dissented from the opinion for
the sole reason that they believed Southland should be over-
ruled.275 They both disagreed with its holding that the FAA
applies to state courts and withdraws state power requiring a
(1988).
269. 115 S. Ct. at 842.
270. Id. Justice Breyer cited testimony that Congress "wanted to 'get a Federal
law' that would 'cover' areas where the Constitution authorized Congress to legislate,
namely 'interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty.'" Id. (citing Joint Hearings on
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1924)):
271. The Court noted that the "commerce-in-fact" test would leave "little work for
the word 'evidencing' (in the phrase 'evidencing a transaction') to perform, for every
contract evidences a transaction." Id. However, Justice Breyer considered that Con-
gress, perhaps, did not intend it to do much work. Given Congress' intent to enforce
arbitration agreements and their use of the Commerce Clause language, Justice
Breyer's hypothesis is reasonable. Id.
272. Id. at 843.
273. Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's holding. Id. at 843-44. She
agreed with Justice Breyer in his interpretation of "involving commerce" and "evidenc-
ing a transaction," but did not feel that the FAA should apply to state courts. Id.
However, she did concede that the ruling should be upheld under the doctrine of
stare decisis. Justice Scalia dissented and addressed only the decision in Southland.
Id. at 844-45. He did not address the issues of "involving commerce" or "evidencing a
transaction" because if Southland were to be overruled, the FAA would not apply to
this state court case. Id. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia also joined, simi-




judicial forum. In light of stare decisis and past holdings, the
majority found their arguments unpersuasive." 8
V. ANALYSIS, REACTION, AND EFFECT OF ALLIED-BRUCE
TERMINIX DECISION ON SECTION 2 OF THE FAA
Once the issues of Allied-Bruce Terminix were addressed and
decided, the focus turned from the United States Supreme
Court to the legislature, lower courts, and commentators to de-
termine its validity. This comment advances the opinion that
the majority's holding was correct. It also addresses the reac-
tions of Congress, the lower courts, and legal commentators.
Finally, it turns to the presumed impact the decision will have
on issues affecting arbitration and section 2 of the FAA.
A. Analysis of the Majority's Decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix
The majority's opinion addressed issues that had been debat-
ed or left unaddressed since the enactment of the FAA in 1925.
The implications of the Court's decision may be more far-reach-
ing than the majority supposed."' However, it is posited that
the majority was correct in its decision regarding the scope and
applicability of the FAA.
1. Scope of "Involving Commerce"
The majority in Allied-Bruce Terminix reaffirmed the deci-
sions of Southland and Perry, both of which held that the FAA
was enacted under the Commerce Clause authority delegated to
Congress."8 This was the correct holding under the doctrine
of stare decisis.
276. See infra part V.A.l.a.
277. See infra part V.D.
278. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987).
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a. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis requires the Court to adhere to
decided cases.279 Without "special justification" there should be
no departure from this doctrine.28 ° The Court in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union gave two examples of "special justifica-
tions" which have required statutory precedents to be overruled.
The first was an "intervening development of the law, through
either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by
Congress."28' In Allied-Bruce Terminix, it was clear that the
judicial doctrine that had grown was the expansion of the
FAA.282 It was also clear that Congress has acted in favor of
the Southland decision.283 Therefore, this example did not of-
fer a "special justification" to avoid stare decisis. The second
example proffered by the Patterson Court is "where the later
law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing
legal doctrines or policies."2" Again, the later law supported
the Southland decision.285 Therefore, the Court was correct in
holding that there was no "special justification" to avoid stare
decisis in Allied-Bruce Terminix.
In addition, "the burden borne by the party advocating the
abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the
Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction."286
Justice Thomas presents the "necessity of 'preserv[ing] state
autonomy in state courts"' as a special justification.287 Howev-
er, the Court has never found "state autonomy" to be a "special
justification." Only one Supreme Court case has even had a
Justice make such an argument.288 It is interesting to note
279. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). This deci-
sion was cited by Justice O'Connor in her discussion regarding the doctrine of stare
decisis and the Southland decision. 115 S. Ct. at 844.
280. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73 (citing Arizona v. Runsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984)).
281. Id. at 173.
282. See supra part III.A-G.
283. See supra note 247 (discussing Congress enacting additional laws).
284. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173.
285. See supra part III.D.
286. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
287. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 850.
288. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 577-
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that although Justice O'Connor made the argument in Garcia,
she did not join Justice Thomas in his position in Allied-Bruce
Terminix. Therefore, the majority correctly found "state autono-
my in state courts" not to be a "special justification" to avoid
stare decisis in Allied-Bruce Terminix, and the principles of
Southland should, therefore, have been upheld.
b. Preemption
Once the doctrine of stare decisis was correctly relied upon
by the Court, its attention could then be focused on analyzing
previous holdings which supported the majority's position that
section 2 of the FAA preempts state anti-arbitration law.289
The FAA, specifically section 2, had been declared a substantive
law resting upon the Commerce Clause.2 ' As such, it was ap-
plicable to state courts and would preempt state law that "con-
flicts with federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 291' Therefore, a statute
such as Alabama's that "require[d] a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration "292 is preempted by section 2 of the
FAA, as was correctly held by the majority.
2. Standard to Apply to Section 2: The "Commerce-in-Fact"
Test Versus the "Contemplation of the Parties" Test
Given the legislative intent to enact a statute that would
enforce arbitration agreements, and the intended far reaching
effects of the Act,293 the Court's holding is reasonable and cor-
89 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
289. Although the preemptive application of section 2 has been decided directly,
there has been no holding that sections 3 and 4 apply in state courts. See supra
notes 33-36, 195, 213-14. Such a discussion, although intriguing and controversial, is
outside the scope of this casenote.
290. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
291. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
292. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; see also, 489 U.S. at 478; Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 490 (1987).
293. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924) (the Act's "control over in-
terstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods
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rect.29 4 As noted in past decisions, section 2 of the FAA has
been given a broad interpretation.295 Holding that the lan-
guage of section 2 is actually a limiting factor to the Act would
be counterproductive to the "congressional declaration of a liber-
al federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"29 and the
Act's purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements evidencing a
transaction involving interstate commerce.297
The holding is supported by prior Supreme Court holdings. In
both Bernhardt and Prima Paint, the Court addressed contracts
"involving commerce."29 In so doing, the Court looked to what
had transpired between the parties through the contract. In
Bernhardt, had the Court found that the parties were "engaging
in activity that affected commerce" the "involving commerce"
requirement would have been met.299 The Court reviewed
whether Bernhardt had in fact engaged in an activity involving
commerce "while performing his duties under the employment
contract.""' The Court did not question whether the parties
contemplated such interstate commerce activity upon entering
the contract. It can reasonably be assumed that the absence of
an inquiry into whether the parties contemplated interstate
commerce raises the presumption that it was not relevant."0 '
In Prima Paint, the Court conducted a similar analysis.0 2
The Court reviewed the transaction between the parties, ob-
served that it was "inextricably tied to" interstate commerce,
and found the contract evidenced "a transaction involving com-
but also contracts relating to interstate commerce").
294. See also Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1984) (supporting
the broad interpretation of 'involving commerce" and linking "involving" with "affect-
ing").
295. See Perry, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland, 465 U.S. 1 (1983).
296. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1982). The Second Circuit combined this federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments with a strong policy favoring arbitration of contract disputes to come to the
conclusion that 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce" should be read broadly.
See Snyder, 736 F.2d at 417.
297. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
298. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1955).
299. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
300. Id.
301. Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417 (7th Cir. 1984).
302. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401.
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merce."30 3 Again, the contemplation of the parties was not rel-
evant to the decision.3' Combining this reasoning with the
Court's holding in Moses H. Cone that "any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or
a like defense to arbitrability,"°' and Justice Marshall's obser-
vation in Perry that the FAA "embodies Congress' intent to pro-
vide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the
full reach of the Commerce Clause,"30 6 supports the Allied-
Bruce Terminix holding.
In addition, there is no support in the legislative history, or
the language of the Act itself, which holds the "contemplation of
the parties" test applicable. Attached to the word "contempla-
tion" was another important word in the test as applied in
Alabama. 37 Alabama required the parties to contemplate "sub-
stantial interstate activity" at the time the parties entered into
the contract and accepted the arbitration clause. °8 The words
"contemplation" and "substantial" added requirements to section
2 that were not included in the Act nor were mentioned in
legislative history.39 The Act defines "involving commerce" in
303. Id.
304. Id. An interesting note that strengthens this position is found in footnote 6 of
the Prima Paint decision. Id. at 401 n.6. The Court provided that the affidavit relied
upon by the court of appeals mentioned that "[t]he agreement . . . contemplated and
intended an orderly transfer of the assets of the defendant to the plaintiff, and fur-
ther contemplated and intended that the defendant would consult, advise, assist and
help the plaintiff." Id. (emphasis added). With this "contemplation" language noted by
the Court, it is reasonable to infer that if the Court had intended to use a "contem-
plation" test, it would have summarily stated that the test was met by the language
of Prima Paint's affidavit. However, they did not mention the contemplation of the
parties and it was not relevant to the decision.
305. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (emphasis added). The Court noted that a defense to arbitrability should be
resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. Applying this argument to Allied-Bruce Terminix,
it seems that the problem of no "contemplation" as a defense versus the application
of the "commerce-in-fact" test should be resolved in favor of arbitration, thereby mak-
ing the "commerce in fact" test the preferred standard.
306. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987).
307. Ex parte Jones, 628 So. 2d 316 (Ala. 1993)
308. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
309. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); 65 CONG. REc. 1931
(1924); Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Com-
mittees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); 9 U.S.C. § 1 (defining "com-
merce").
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terms of the Commerce Clause.31 ° It does not mention that
such commerce must be contemplated at the time of the agree-
ment or be any more "substantial" than it must be to fall under
the Commerce Clause. The legislative history of the Act pro-
vides that Congress' intent was to pass legislation that covered
contracts regarding actual physical interstate commerce and
also contracts merely "relating to interstate commerce.""' This
expansive goal cannot be met by applying Alabama's limiting
standards and the Court was correct in its holding.
In rejecting the "contemplation of the parties" test, the Court
explicitly avoided interpreting "involving commerce" narrowly
for fear of creating a new "unfamiliar" test. Given the fact that
Congressman Graham stressed to Congress that the Act would
not create any "new principle of law" or "new legislation,""
this reasoning is correct. Also, the Court's decision not to inter-
pret "involving commerce" narrowly is correct given the effect
such an interpretation would have on arbitration. A narrow
interpretation would require either the parties or the courts to
determine what "involving commerce" should mean. Such a
result would unnecessarily complicate the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements and breed litigation-the very occurrence
which Congress sought to avoid through enacting the FAA.
The "contemplation of the parties" test was also dismissed
due to its effect on arbitration agreements made after the par-
ties entered into contracts. If a "contemplation of the parties"
test were allowed, then, as Justice Breyer noted, an arbitration
agreement made after the parties entered into the contract
would potentially be passed over for FAA application.313 This
seems appropriate considering congressional intent to enforce
arbitration agreements. " Further, there is nothing in the leg-
islative history to suggest that such a result should occur since
the arbitration agreements included in section 2 were only
qualified with the requirements that they be in writing and be
310. See supra notes 28 and accompanying text.
311. H.R. REP No. 96, 68th Cong, 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
312. 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924).
313. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 842.
314. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
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contained in "any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce."
315
B. Congressional and Judicial Reaction to Allied-Bruce
Terminix
Although the majority in Allied-Bruce Terminix met with a
strong dissent, legislative and judicial reactions to the decision
have been positive. There has been no action by Congress to
restrict the enforcement of arbitration agreements or to define
the ambiguous terms "involving commerce" or "evidencing.
" 311
Regarding judicial reaction, there have been no cases to date
that have challenged the holding in Allied-Bruce Terminix or
have called for a reversal of cases relied on by the majority.
1. State Courts
The State courts have consistently followed the Allied-Bruce
Terminix decision without questioning or expanding its hold-
ing.3 17 Most state court cases that cite Allied-Bruce Terminix
involve the issue of state statute preemption by the FAA. Many
of the cases involve state arbitration laws addressing arbitra-
315. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
316. Congress has recently introduced an amendment to the FAA which would
establish, within the FAA, the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act. 141 CONG. REC.
S2268-03, 2271 (statement of Rep. Feingold). Representative Feingold introduced a bill
which "mirrors a House bill introduced [in 1994] by Representatives Patricia
Schroeder, Edward Markey, and Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky." Id. The bill would
amend the FAA, among other statutes, to extend protection of the bill to "claims of
unlawful discrimination that arise under State or local law, and other Federal laws
that prohibit job discrimination." Id. The bill would specifically amend Title 9 of the
United States Code by adding "(b)" to section 14 of the FAA. Section 14(b) would
read: "(b) This chapter shall not apply with respect to a claim of unlawful discrimina-
tion in employment if such claim arises from discrimination based on race, color, re-
ligion, sex, national origin, age, or disability." Id. Rep. Feingold assured the President
of the United States, upon introduction of this bill, that it was "in no way intended
to bar the use of voluntary arbitration .... In fact, I strongly support the use of
voluntary alternative dispute resolution methods as a way of reducing the caseloads
of civil and criminal courts where appropriate." Id.
317. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621
(1995); Columbus Anesthesia Group v. Kutzner, 459 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995);
Tim Huey Corp. v. Global Boiler and Mechanical, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1358 (IM. App. Ct.
1995); Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1995); Mr. Mudd, Inc. v.
Petra Tech, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
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tion procedure; not statutes making arbitration agreements
unenforceable, such as the Alabama statute in Allied-Bruce
Terminix. One such case involved a Georgia arbitration statute
which required initials beside terms and conditions of employ-
ment in a contract before the term could be enforced. 1
The state courts also cite Allied-Bruce Terminix for the prop-
osition that the scope of the FAA is as broad as Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority, and that the appropriate test to deter-
mine whether the FAA, and specifically section 2, applies to
arbitration agreements is the "commerce-in-fact" test. 19 In the
Georgia case discussed above, the court found that when agree-
ments "involve interstate commerce, the federal law applies to
enforce the arbitration provision." "O They reiterated that "in-
volving commerce" is the "functional equivalent of the phrase
'affecting commerce,' which normally signals Congress' intent to
exercise its commerce power to the full[est]."32' However, the
court did not find that the facts evidenced activity involving
interstate commerce. 2  Specifically, the case involved the
"[c]ontribution of equipment to a professional corporation after
its formation" and the court found that it did "not affect inter-
state commerce within the meaning of the [FAA]."3"
2. Federal Courts
The Federal courts have similarly followed the holding in
Allied-Bruce Terminix.124 There are no cases that attempt to
expand upon the holding or question its reasoning. The majori-
ty of cases citing Allied-Bruce Terminix do so to establish the
318. Columbus Anesthesia Group v. Kutzner, 459 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(addressing Georgia Arbitration statute OCGA § 9-9-2(c)(9)).
319. Engalla, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; Columbus, 459 S.E.2d at 423-24; Mr. Mudd,
892 S.W.2d at 392.
320. Columbus, 459 S.E.2d at 423.
321. Id. at 423-24 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834
(1995)).
322. Id. at 424.
323. Id.
324. Gingiss Int'l. Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995); Juno SRL v. SN
Endeavour, 58 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995); Williams v. CIGNA Fin. Advisors, 56 F.3d 656
(5th Cir. 1995); Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995); McKee v. Home Buyers
Warranty Corp. II, 45 F.3d 981 (5th Cir. 1995); McDonald v. Rodriguez, 184 B.R. 514
(S.D. Tex. 1995).
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applicability of the FAA. 25 These cases follow Allied-Bruce
Terminix's reasoning that the FAA applies to arbitration agree-
ments in contracts "involving commerce," that Congress intend-
ed the phrase "involving commerce" to have as broad a reach as
Congress is given under the Commerce Clause, and that the
"commerce-in-fact" test governs the review of whether a con-
tract was "involving commerce." 26
3. United States Supreme Court
Three months after the Court decided Allied-Bruce Terminix,
the Supreme Court decided another case involving section 2 of
the FAA. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,327
involved a complaint from a client of Shearson Lehman Hutton
(Shearson), a securities brokerage and investment firm, alleging
that the firm had mishandled their account. Pursuant to an
arbitration agreement contained in the parties' contract, 28 the
parties entered into arbitration. Shearson argued during the
proceedings that the arbitrator had no authority to award puni-
325. Gingiss Int'l Inc. v. Bonnet, 58 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995); Williams v. CIGNA
Fin. Advisors, 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995); McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp.
H, 45 F.3d 981 (5th Cir. 1995); McDonald v. Rodriguez, 184 B.R. 514 (S.D. Tex.
1995).
326. Gingiss, 58 F.3d at 328 (holding that franchise agreement between two com-
panies to open store in another state "involved commerce"); Williams, 56 F.3d at 659
(citing Allied-Bruce Terminix for the proposition that "Congress exercised its 'com-
merce power to the full' in enacting § 2 of the FAA"); McKee, 45 F.3d at 984 (apply-
ing FAA to contract "involving commerce" where Louisiana couple bought house and
sued out-of-state warranty company); McDonald, 184 B.R. at 516 (giving "involving
commerce ... a broad meaning" and proposition that the contract in dispute was
"affecting commerce").
327. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
328. The arbitration agreement and choice of law clause read, in part:
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson's] successors
and assigns shall be binding on the undersigned, my [petitioner's] heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns, and shall be governed by the laws
of the State of New York. Unless unenforceable due to federal or state
law, any controversy arising out of or relating to [my] accounts, to trans-
actions with you, your officers, directors, agents and/or employees for me
or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange Inc. as I may elect.
115 S. Ct. at 1216 n.2 (emphasis added).
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tive damages.329 However, the arbitrator awarded them to
Mastrobuono despite Shearson's protests.3"' Shearson argued
that the contract contained a choice of law clause, the clause
stated that New York law would apply, and that New York law
clearly established that arbitrators cannot award punitive dam-
ages.33' Shearson offered Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. ,332 a
New York Court of Appeals case, to support its position that
awarding punitive damages can only be done in judicial tribu-
nals. Mastrobuono's rebuttal to Shearson's argument was that
the arbitration agreement did not specifically preclude punitive
damage awards and that the rules of NASD arbitrators ex-
pressly state that arbitrators are allowed to award punitive
damages.333
The Court followed Mastrobuono's argument, finding that,
although the conflict of law clause and the arbitration agree-
ment differ in their treatment of punitive damages, the punitive
damage award should be enforced.31 4 The Court noted that Al-
lied-Bruce Terminix was a similar case in that the petitioner
sought the Court's ruling that the FAA preempts state law.335
Although the Court reached a result in Mastrobuono similar to
the decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix, the reasoning was differ-
ent. In Allied-Bruce Terminix, the Court "upheld the enforce-
ability of [the parties'] predispute arbitration agreement gov-
erned by Alabama law, even though an Alabama statute pro-
vide[d] that arbitration agreements [were] unenforceable. 35
In Mastrobuono, the Court did not hold that the FAA preempt-
ed the New York law regarding punitive damage awards. In-
stead, the Court reasoned that the agreement was "ambiguous"
as to the parties' intentions regarding punitive damages and
that such ambiguities should be "resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion."337 Therefore, the punitive damage award should have
329. Id. at 1214.
330. Id.
331. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
332. Id.
333. The section of the NASD arbitration rules addressing punitive damages states
that "[t]he issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in arbitrations.
Parties to arbitration are informed that arbitrators can consider punitive damages as
a remedy." 115 S. Ct. at 1218 (emphasis added).
334. Id. at 1219.
335. Id. at 1215.
336. Id. at 1215.
337. Id. at 1218 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
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been enforced absent express intentions of the parties to the
contrary. The Allied-Bruce Terminix decision was neither ex-
panded, questioned, or even substantially relied upon in
Mastrobuono.
C. Legal Commentators' Reaction to the Allied-Bruce Terminix
Decision
Thus far, there has been virtually no reaction by legal com-
mentators to the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision. The few publi-
cations that address the combined issues of arbitration, section
2 of the FAA, and the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision are sup-
portive of the decision and its effects on arbitration. 38 These
publications do not disagree with the Court's decisions or rea-
soning. The publication from the Dispute Resolution Journal re-
views the Court's Allied-Bruce Terminix decision and views it
as "a major victory for proponents of ADR." 39 The publication
from the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution outlines the
evolution of commercial arbitration and proposes a model to
follow for the arbitration process.3" The author describes the
current arbitration process and related issues, citing Allied-
Bruce Terminix for support in issues that had not been directly
addressed by the case itself.3 4' Both publications are silent as
to the validity of the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision and reason-
ing.
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
338. See Stanley D. Bynum et al., The Supreme Court's Decision on Terminix Re-
affirms the Scope of the FAA, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 8 (1995); Stephen Hayford & Ralph
Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue,
10 OH. ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 343 (1995).
339. Bynum, et al., supra note 337.
340. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 338.
341. Id. at 347 n.8 (noting the "Supreme Court's abandonment of its longstanding
skepticism as to the suitability of contractually provided arbitration as a method for
adjudicating commercial disputes otherwise appropriate for adjudication in court"); 352
n.22 (addressing the absence of statutes in Alabama and West Virginia providing for
enforcement of arbitration agreements); 358 n.56 (noting that unequal bargaining
strength is not an obstacle for compulsory arbitration); 358-59 n.61 (for the proposi-
tion that states can invalidate arbitration agreements upon the same grounds as for
the revocation of any contract).
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D. Effect of Allied-Bruce Terminix Decision on Arbitration and
Arbitration Agreements
The long-term effects of the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision
are not certain, but it seems clear that it has unalterably af-
fected three areas of arbitration and the FAA. The first is the
use of arbitration and arbitration agreements in general. The
second is the way in which courts will interpret and apply
section 2 of the FAA. The third is the effect on state arbitration
statutes.
1. Arbitration in General
It is likely that the number of cases submitted to arbitration
will continue to rise, as they have for the past few years.342
Due to the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision, businesses will be
more insistent in requiring and including arbitration agree-
ments in contracts with consumers. Now that the hostility to-
wards arbitration agreements, as evidenced by numerous state
and federal courts, has been expressly condemned and forbidden
by the holding, businesses will be more assured that a given
arbitration agreement will be enforced. However, it is unlikely
that the decision will have any substantial effect on the word-
ing of the agreements or their placement in the contract. An
agreement that does -not include the words "interstate com-
merce" will still be enforceable against the parties if it "evidenc-
es a transaction involving commerce" as proven by the "com-
merce-in-fact" test.
Another reason for the increased number of cases submitted
to arbitration is the increase in refusals to enter contracts con-
taining arbitration agreements. The Allied-Bruce Terminix deci-
sion, while dispositive on the issue of section 2's applicability,
carries no weight when the contract in dispute does not contain
an arbitration agreement. The FAA only enforces voluntarily
agreed upon arbitration agreements.3" It does not require ar-
bitration in a contract evidencing a transaction involving
342. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
343. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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commerce unless that contract contains such an arbitration
provision.
2. Court's Analysis of Section 2 of the FAA
As discussed above,'" the lower courts have not questioned
the holding in Allied-Bruce Terminix. It is likely that both the
state and federal courts will continue to follow the reasoning of
Allied-Bruce Terminix in analyzing cases involving section 2 of
the FAA. It seems unlikely that section 2 can be expanded any
more than it has been under the Supreme Court's analysis over
the past fifty years. As has been the case with recent decisions,
courts will spend less time establishing that a contract evidence
a transaction involving commerce," reviewing instead the na-
ture of the contract and the "grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."346 This will be due
to the speculated increase in arguments including contract revo-
cation principles such as fraud in the inducement, duress, and
unconscionability.
An interesting development to watch for is the possible de-
crease in section 2 cases actually being reviewed by courts. It is
likely that arbitration agreements will indeed be more arbitrat-
ed than litigated, as intended by Congress in enacting the FAA.
How this will affect section 2 of the FAA is unclear. Perhaps
the current case law surrounding section 2 analysis and appli-
cability will be dispositive on the subject. However, some linger-
ing issues still need to be addressed by the courts. One such
issue is whether sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, the procedural
sections of the Act, are applicable in state court.34 As dis-
cussed above, the issue has been largely avoided by the Su-
344. See supra part V.B.1-3 (judicial reaction section).
345. Columbus v. Kutzner, 459 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Mr. Mudd, Inc.
v. Petra Tech, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
346. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
347. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10
(1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.34
(1983). This point was also addressed by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Allied-
Bruce Terminix. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting,
joined by Scalia, J.).
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preme Court in its prior decisions."a If there is a decrease in
section 2 cases being reviewed, this issue may remain unad-
dressed.
3. Effect on State Arbitration Law
The effect of the Allied-Bruce Terminix decision on state
arbitration law is, in some respects, quite clear and, in other
respects, ambiguous. Regarding state statutes holding arbitra-
tion agreements to be unenforceable in state courts,349 those
statutes will be amended, superseded with new legislation,
stricken from the states' codes, or simply left in the code and
disregarded when a contract contains an arbitration agreement.
State arbitration procedure laws will be dealt with differently.
Aside from the section 3 and 4 issue above, the Supreme Court
has given few insights as to whether state arbitration law will
be preempted by the FAA. Generally, if the contract contains a
choice of law clause, and the appropriate state arbitration law
conflicts with the FAA and limits the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, then the courts will apply the FAA.35° If the con-
flict does not affect enforcement of arbitration agreements, or
broadens the scope of enforcement of arbitration agreements,
the courts are likely to apply the more lenient state arbitration
statute over the FAA. 51
The preemption of state arbitration law was addressed by
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Allied-Bruce
Terminix. Finding the broad application of section 2 "trouble-
some," Justice O'Connor posited that the broad reading of sec-
tion 2 "will displace many state statutes carefully calibrated to
protect consumers . .. and state procedural requirements aimed
at ensuring knowing and voluntary consent."3 52 The examples
given, although written to protect the average consumer, will be
displaced by the FAA in future cases.353
348. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
349. ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3)(1993); GA. CODE § 9-9-2(c)(9).
350. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
351. See Volt, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
352. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
353. The examples given by Justice O'Connor clearly involved statutes designed to




The Allied-Bruce Terminix decision broadened the FAA's
ability to govern and enforce written arbitration agreements by
extending its reach to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. Arbitration has long been a popular avenue for parties
to resolve disputes quickly and less expensively. Congress clear-
ly intended for the FAA to ensure that arbitration remain a
viable alternative in dispute resolution. The Supreme Court
decided in Allied-Bruce Terminix that arbitration agreements
shall be enforced whenever an "interstate commerce" connection
can be made. And by adopting the "commerce-in-fact" test and
laying to rest the "contemplation of the parties" test, many
more arbitration agreements are reviewable under, and will be
enforced through, section 2 of the FAA. This result accords with
the very intent Congress had in enacting the FAA seventy
years ago."M
Although the Court's treatment of the FAA has followed a
general pattern of expansive interpretation, it left critical issues
either unanswered or ambiguous. The decision in Allied-Bruce
Terminix correctly addressed these issues and is dispositive on
those matters. It is likely that the Supreme Court will continue
to hold this expansive view of the FAA and the lower courts
will apply it to contracts that pass the "commerce-in-fact" test.
It is also likely that Congress will not amend or address any of
the issues addressed in Allied-Bruce Terminix; relying instead
on its holding to regulate the lower courts' and the States'
application of section 2 of the FAA to arbitration agreements.
Finally, as litigation costs increase, more contracts will contain
arbitration agreements and more parties will employ the doc-
trines under section 2 of the FAA to resolve disputes surround-
ing those agreements.
Preston Douglas Wigner
114(2)(b) (1993) which refuses to enforce arbitration clauses in consumer contract
where the consideration is $5,000 or less. Id. The second example was S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Supp. 1993) which requires that notice of arbitration provisions be
"prominently" placed on the first page of a contract. Id. These statutes, although
seemingly benign, will be preempted by the FAA. For an excellent discussion of the
FAA's impact on state procedural law see Schumacher, supra note 31.
354. H.R. REP. No 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
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